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PRAGMATISM 
Pragmatism is the distinctive contribution of American 
thought to philosophy. It is a movement that attracted 
much attention in the early part of the twentieth century, 
went into decline, and reemerged in the last part of the 
century. Part of the difficulty in defining pragmatism is 
that misconceptions of what pragmatism means have 
abounded since its beginning, and continue in today's 
"neopragmatism." 




Pragmatism is a method of philosophy begun by Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), popularized by William 
James (1842-1910), and associated with two other major 
early representatives, John Dewey (1859-1952) and George 
Herbert Mead (1863-1931). Pragmatism was defined in 
1878 by Peirce ((1878]1992) as follows: "Consider what 
effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception 
of the object" (p. 132). 
William James's book Pragmatism ([1907] 1977) gath­
ered together lectures he had been giving on the subject 
since 1898 and launched a much broader interest in prag­
matism and also controversy concerning what the philosophy 
means. Most early critics took James as the representative of 
pragmatism, yet Peirce claimed that James misunderstood 
his definition in holding the meaning of a concept to be the 
actual conduct it produces rather than the conceivable con­
duct. Early European critics such as Georg Simmel, Emile 
Durkheim, and Max Horkheimer took pragmatism to be an 
example of an American mentality that reduced truth to 
mere expediency, to what James unfortunately once 
expressed as "the cash value of an act." There has also been 
a tendency to confuse the philosophy with the everyday 
meaning of the word pragmatic as expedient, yet Peirce, 
citing Kant, was careful to distinguish pragmatic from 
practical. 
PRAGMATIC OR PRACTICAL? 
James was interested in the experiencing individual, for 
whom practical events marked the test of ideas. As he 
put it in Pragmatism: "The whole function of philosophy 
ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make 
to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world­
formula or that world-formula he the true one" ([1907] 
1977:379). Philosophy is taken by James to be a means for 
practical life, whereas for Peirce, pragmatism was a 
method for attaining clarity of ideas within a normative 
conception of logic, that is, within the norms of continu­
ing, self-correcting inquiry directed toward truth. Logical 
meaning, for Peirce, is not found in "definite instants of 
our life" but in the context of the community of self ­
correcting inquiry. And truth is that opinion the community 
would reach, given sufficient inquiry, and which is known 
fallibly by individuals. 
The earliest roots of pragmatism are to be found in the 
remarkable series of papers from around 1868, published 
when Peirce was 29 years old. In "Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities," and its four denials of Cartesianism, he 
destroyed the Cartesian foundations of modem philosophy. 
Against Descartes's attempt to base science on the indu­
bitable foundations of immediate know ledge, Peirce argued 
that we have no powers of introspection or of intuition, 
using these terms in their technical logical sense as meaning 
direct, unmediated, dyadic knowledge. Cognitions are instead 
determined by previous cognitions, and all cognitions are 
inferences or mediate signs that, in tum, address interpret­
ing signs. The possibility of scientific truth does not derive 
from indubitable foundations but by the self-correcting 
process of interpretation. Peirce, who rejected foundation­
alism, proposed a regulative ideal of an unlimited commu­
nity of inquirers, capable of inquiry into the indefinite 
future as a basis for fallible, objective knowledge. It is 
within this context of a general community of interpretation 
that the "conceivable consequences" of pragmatic meaning 
are to be found. 
Peirce's pragmatism must be understood within his con­
ceptions of semiotic (doctrine of signs) and of inquiry, as 
must his separation of it from practical life. Peirce differed 
from the other pragmatists in keeping theory separate from 
practice, not out of elitism, hut because in this master 
scientist's view, the scientific method is not vital enough 
to run society or one's individual life. 1n his view, practical 
decisions often need to be based on beliefs and gut feelings, 
which produce the "definite difference" of James, whereas 
theoretical life can only be based on fallible opinions, 
always subject to correction within the unlimited commu­
nity of inquiry. Pragmatic meaning is found, as he put it 
elsewhere, not in a particular experiment but in experimen­
tal phenomena, not in "any particular event that did happen 
to somebody in the dead past, but what surely will happen 
to everybody in the living future who shall fulfill certain 
conditions" (1931-1938, vol. 5, para. 425). 
The term conceivable marks the difference between 
Peirce's and James's pragmatic maxims. In reducing Peirce's 
"conceivable consequences" to consequences, James 
seemed not to understand why conceivable consequences 
are not exhausted by actual instances, and why "prag­
matic," in the philosophical sense, is very different from 
"practical," in the everyday sense. 
What works today, in a practical sense, may not work 
tomorrow, and may not work tomorrow because conceiv­
able consequences not yet actualized today came to 
fruition, and may yet come to further fruition. "Ye may 
know them by their fruits," is pragmatic, when one consid­
ers those fruits as conceivable consequences, capable of 
further fruition, that is, as general. 
The pragmatic meaning of a stop sign is that it will 
determine consequences in general and not simply the indi­
vidual autos that stop. It is also the autos that would stop, 
that is, the conceivable consequences. For these reasons, 
Peirce attempted to distinguish his own original version of 
pragmatism from the one James popularized and that 
others, such as F. C. S. Schiller and Giovanni Papini, drew 
their own versions from. So he renamed his original version 
pragmaticism, a term, he added, "ugly enough to be safe 
from kidnappers." 
PRAGMATISM AS GENERAL OUTLOOK 
Peirce and James first met as students at Harvard 
University, yet neither held PhDs. Peirce had a master's 
degree in chemistry and James received an MD. John 
Dewey received one of the first PhDs in philosophy in the 
United States from Johns Hopkins University in 1884, 
where he studied briefly with Peirce. Dewey met Mead, 
who received a PhD from Harvard, when they taught briefly 
at the University of Michigan, and a few years later, after 
being named chairman of philosophy, psychology, and ped­
agogy at the University of Chicago, brought Mead there. 
Late in his life, penniless, Peirce added a middle name of 
"Santiago"-St. James-in thanks to a fund James put 
together on his behalf. 
One sees a broad range of topics in the writings of these 
four "classic" pragmatists, in contrast to the growing 
demands for technical "specialization" that marked the 
course of academic philosophy. But when these early prag­
matists are invoked, it is usually not only for their particu­
lar doctrines of pragmatism but rather their larger 
philosophical outlooks in general that are included as 
"pragmatist thought" and that do share some similarities. 
So the term pragmatism is often used to describe 
the broader philosophical movement, including Peirce's 
doctrine of signs, Dewey's philosophy of "instrumental­
ism," and Mead's developmental model of the self. 
Pragmatism in general was an attempt to undercut the 
Cartesian-Kantian problem of starting with a subject and an 
object and then figuring out how to put them together. It 
denied that knowledge was reducible either to a knowing 
subject or to an immediate sensation of an object, thus 
rejecting rationalism and the sensationalism of British 
empiricism. Pragmatism denied the myth of a private and 
asocially constituted subject or object by locating meaning 
in the vital tissue of the generalized community. It began 
instead with triadic mediated sign-acts, from which could 
be prescinded a "subject" and an "object." Objectivity is 
thus thoroughly social and mediate, rather than individual 
and immediate. 
Though James may have been short on philosophical 
rigor, his writings brimmed with ideas and vigor. In 
Pragmatism, for example, he set out in the opening chapter 
his distinction between tough-minded and tender-minded 
outlooks. In his Principles of Psychology (1890), he coined 
the term stream of consciousness, and he developed the idea 
of "The Moral Equivalent of War" in 1910 in an essay of 
that title, a mobilization for a kind of peace corps. 
In his later work, James developed his philosophy in The 
Will to Believe (l 897), in which truth again is viewed from 
the experiencing individual, and in A Pluralistic Universe 
(1909), where he emphasized multiple perspectives over a 
"monistic" theory of truth. Against what he saw as a "block 
universe" in idealism, James argued for a pluralistic and 
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open-ended universe that would allow for the qualitative 
uniqueness of experience. 
All four pragmatists carved out phenomenological 
aspects of their theories. Peirce literally founded a phe­
nomenology around the same time as Edmund Husserl, 
though he settled on the term phaneroscopy to avoid con­
fusing it with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. James 
began with the phenomenon of religious experience rather 
than belief or authority in his study of The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (1902). Qualitative immediacy is an 
element of communicative conduct in Dewey's and Mead's 
theories of aesthetic experience, of the problematic situa­
tion, of Mead's discussions of the place of emergence and 
novelty, and of his work The Philosophy of the Present 
(1932), of Peirce and Dewey's discussions of the first stage 
of inquiry-Peirce's "abductive inference" and Dewey's 
"problem finding"-and of Peirce, James, and Mead's dis­
cussions of the "I" as an element of the "I" "me" internal 
dialogue that constitutes thought. 
James and Dewey, the chief public spokespersons for 
pragmatism, were also powerful manifestations of the mod­
ernist impulse in the early twentieth century. Their ardent 
optimism, pluralism, and situationalism showed new ways 
to reconceive mind as vitally continuous with nature, expe­
rience, and conduct. Dewey was the most widely known 
public philosopher in America in the first half of the twen­
tieth century, and social reform was a central preoccupation 
of his public philosophy. He had become associated with 
Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr and their social settle­
ment Hull House in the 1890s, which they founded in 
Chicago shortly before Dewey arrived there. Mead shared 
Dewey's interests in social reform and the possibilities for 
reconstructing democratic life in America. Though his 
work was hardly known outside academic circles, Mead 
became a mainstay in sociology, even as Dewey's reputa­
tion went with pragmatism into eclipse in mid-century phi­
losophy. Through his student Herbert Blumer, philosopher 
and social psychologist Mead became a representative of 
"Chicago sociology" and what Blumer termed "symbolic 
interactionism." 
It should be noted that all four pragmatists were active 
as psychologists: Peirce and James were active in experi­
mental psychology, and Dewey and Mead were interested 
in developmental psychology, and specifically in the 
"genetic epistemology" movement in America in the 1890s 
and on. Dewey published a key functional psychology 
article in 1896, "The Reflex Arc in Psychology." There he 
argued that the stimulus-response arc model needed to be 
reconceived functionally as a "circuit, a continual reconsti­
tution," rather than an arc, in which both stimulus and 
response occur within a mediating organic coordination 
rather than as only externally related. This kind of argument 
reappears in his later tum to the context of the situation and 
in his late view of meaning as transaction. 
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Mead is perhaps most known to sociologists for his 
developmental theory of the self, which involves a progres­
sive internalization of the other, beginning in a "conversa­
tion of gestures," through a level of "play" involving specific 
others, and culminating in a "generalized other," an inner 
representation of community who is "me" in that internal 
dialogue of "I" and "me" that comprises the self of self­
consciousness. In Mead's view, it is the internalized "atti­
tudes" and values of the community, and not only a specific 
role model, that mark the fully developed human self. 
The human ability to engage in gestural conversations 
retains its preconscious animal sensing and emotional com­
municative origins while yet embedded in the inner repre­
sentation of social life that is the generalized other. Mead 
termed this representation "the significant symbol," which 
is a gesture, sign, or word simultaneously addressed to the 
self and another individual. 
Communicative mind is a semiotic process for Mead and 
the other pragmatists, involving neural processes, though 
not reducible to them. Mind is viewed not as internal to the 
brain but as in transaction with its environment. Mind, as 
the communicative organ of the self, involves the further 
interpretations and pragmatic consequences it engenders. 
ECLIPSE AND REEMERGENCE 
Part of the confusion over pragmatism has to do with the 
peculiar history of thought in the twentieth century as phi­
losophy became institutionalized in American universities 
and as scientific modernism swept away American philoso­
phy. Though he was Mead's former student and editor of 
the publication of Mead's lectures, Mind, Self, and Society 
(1934), Charles Morris believed that logical positivism and 
its claim to dyadic knowledge based in "thing-sentences" 
(or semantic reference) provided philosophical foundations 
more scientific than pragmatism. The open-ended Chicago 
pragmatism of Dewey and Mead, centering on the human 
being within a live social environment-a human capable 
of criticism, cultivation, emergence, and continued growth 
in the community of interpretation-was replaced in the 
1930s at the University of Chicago by the closed positivist 
dream of the completion of philosophy personified by 
Morris and Viennese refugee Rudolph Carnap, and later by 
the even more stringent technicalism of analytic philosophy 
that in tum replaced positivism. 
In his 1938 monograph Foundations of a Theory of 
Signs, Morris systematically reduced Peirce's triadic view 
of signs to a dyadic-based positivism without acknowl­
edgment of Peirce or of Peirce's logical arguments for signs 
as triadic inferences (as Dewey pointed out in an essay written 
when he was in his late 80s), although Morris did acknowl­
edge Peirce a couple of decades later. A number of Morris's 
inverted Peircean semiotic terms, such as "pragmatics," 
have become institutionalized, despite their reversal of 
Peirce's definitions. To use Peirce's term pragmatism, and 
then claim originality for the term pragmatics as a specifi­
cally semiotical term, without describing the relation of 
Peirce's pragmatism to semiotic, or how Morris's view rad­
ically departed from the source terms he uses-claiming 
that it is about "the relations of signs to their users," as 
though the users are not also signs-amounts to the further 
"kidnapping" of the meaning of pragmatism. 
Philosophical pragmatism resurfaced as a significant 
part of intellectual life in the last decades of the twentieth 
century. What had been a body of thought reduced largely 
to the influence of Mead in academic social science, and 
passing references to James, Dewey, and Peirce, reemerged 
with significance for semiotics, philosophy, literary criti­
cism, and other disciplines. There are ongoing collected 
works projects for all four pragmatists. 
James's and Dewey's situationally based philosophies 
now seemed to provide a vital alternative to the narrowly 
positivist/language analysis world in which academic phi­
losophy had become enclosed in the Anglo-American con­
text. Strangely enough, Mead's fortunes rose in the 1940s 
and 1950s in sociology just as his work and that of the other 
pragmatists were being eclipsed in philosophy. Symbolic 
interactionism had functioned in mid-century to keep the 
Meadian stream of pragmatic thought flowing, though it 
lost sight of the other pragmatists. Now Mead has begun to 
be taken seriously by philosophers again. 
N EOPRAGMATISM 
Jiirgen Habermas and Richard Rorty are two widely 
discussed thinkers closely associated with the renewal of 
interest in pragmatism. Both are heavily influenced by 
the "linguistic tum"-by the dominant postwar Anglo­
American "language analysis" (out of which Rorty in par­
ticular derives )-and both are contributors to attempts to 
link Anglo-American and continental philosophies. 
Influenced both by his colleague Karl-Otto Apel 's 
inquiry into Peirce and the tendency of critical theorists, 
such as Max Horkheimer, to view pragmatism as posi­
tivism, Habermas depicted the pragmatisms of Charles 
Peirce and John Dewey in his early work Knowledge and 
Human Interests (1971), as having critical potential, yet as 
ultimately ingredients in the development of modem posi­
tivism. He viewed pragmatism from a Kantian and 
Weberian standpoint as a doctrine of inferential inquiry 
legitimized by transcendental structures of instrumental 
action. 
Habermas missed Peirce's crucial rejection of Kant's tran­
scendental philosophy: To put it tersely in Kantian terms, 
science is not the "synthesis" of the immediate, as Kant 
thought, but rather the "analysis" of the mediate, of signs. 
Habermas also imposed a Weberian concept of strategic, 
"instrumental action" that was alien to Peirce's community 
of interpretation framework and that of the other 
pragmatists as well, including Dewey's "instrumentalism." 
Nevertheless, the explosion of interest in Habermas, in 
connection with Apel's inquiries, also sparked interest in 
pragmatism both in Europe and America. Apel, who trans­
lated Peirce into German, helped to show how Peirce's 
rejection of foundationalism had, in effect, transformed 
Kant's transcendental subject into a "transcendental" unlim­
ited community of inquirers as the limit of knowledge. 
Apel's reintroduction of the term transcendental, in its 
technical sense, to Peirce's philosophy is problematic, since 
Peirce believed that the pragmatic maxim denied Kant's 
concept of incognizable things-in-themselves and thereby 
the concept of transcendental underpinnings. 
Habermas's appreciation of pragmatism grew since 
those early works, and he attempted to develop a "theory of 
communicative action," based on a concept of "linguisti­
cally generated intersubjectivity" influenced in part by 
Mead. Although Habermas sought to come to terms with 
the body of pragmatism as a whole, his theory of commu­
nicative action remains grounded in Kantian dichotomies at 
variance with the pragmatic tradition. 
Rorty claims to be a pragmatist influenced by Dewey, as 
well as such seemingly distant sources as Martin Heidegger 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The pragmatic vision Rorty extols 
is that of philosophy as conversation instead of a quest for 
truth or wisdom. In his book Consequences of Pragmatism 
(1982), Rorty depicted pragmatism as a doctrine rooted in a 
conception of inquiry, but inquiry as unconstrained conven­
tional conversation. 
Rorty's pragmatist bears an uncanny resemblance to the 
language game approach of later Wittgenstein and his rejec­
tion of his early "picture theory of knowledge." The prag­
matists also rejected such foundationalism, beginning with 
Peirce's bold anti-Cartesian articles of the late 1860s and 
culminating with Dewey and Bentley's Knowing and the 
Known in 1949, but they did so by articulating a fallibilist, 
experiential model of inquiry that showed, in contrast to 
Rorty's statement, how the "nature of objects" and the evo­
lutionary biosocial genius of the human mind tempered or 
constrained inquiry toward truth and "self-knowledge." 
Despite Rorty's claim of being a pragmatist, a number of 
his leading ideas are at odds with pragmatism. Peirce, James, 
Dewey, and Mead were all genuinely interested in exploring 
the place of biology in human conduct, yet Rorty denies the 
influence of biology. Peirce, Dewey, and Mead developed 
theories of meaning that involved more than conventional sig­
nification, yet Rorty views signs as purely conventional. The 
four earlier pragmatists all viewed experience as an element 
of conduct, yet Rorty ( 1989) limits conduct to conventional or 
contingent meaning, claiming that people are solely products 
of socialization-"There is nothing to people except what has 
been socialized into them." (p. 177). Unlike Dewey, Rorty 
denies continuity between the self and its community. 
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Finally, pragmatism is at heart a philosophy of purport, 
yet Rorty's postmodern outlook denies authentic purpo­
siveness, viewing meaning as sets of conventions. Meaning 
is simply what one happens to believe, subject to arbitrary 
"redescriptions," and the pragmatic criterion of conse­
quences is undone. 
Despite shortcomings in contemporary neopragmatism, 
the ongoing reengagement with the earlier pragmatists 
shows that significant consequences for social theory are 
still being discovered. 
- Eugene Halton 
See also Habermas, Jiirgen; Mead, George Herbert; Rorty, Richard; 
Self and Self-Concept; Symbolic Interaction 
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